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Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different opponent instead of
adopting the same strategy against all of them in the prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed
populations. We consider an evolutionary process in which strategies that provide reproductive
success are imitated and players replace one of their worst interactions by the new one. We set
individuals in a well-mixed population so that network reciprocity effect is excluded and we analyze
both synchronous and asynchronous updates. As a consequence of the replacement rule, we show
that mutual cooperation is never destroyed and the initial fraction of mutual cooperation is a
lower bound for the level of cooperation. We show by simulation and mean-field analysis that
for synchronous update cooperation dominates while for asynchronous update only cooperations
associated to the initial mutual cooperations are maintained. As a side effect of the replacement rule,
an “implicit punishment” mechanism comes up in a way that exploitations are always neutralized
providing evolutionary stability for cooperation.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 89.65.-s, 02.50.Le
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1. Introduction
Cooperative dilemma was initially studied in the
framework of classical game theory. Usually individu-
als have two strategies: cooperation and defection. A
cooperator provides a benefit to the opponent and pays
a cost for that. A defector receives the benefits if the
opponent is a cooperator. This defines a material pay-
off. If individuals maximize their material payoff, it is
well know that defection will dominate [1]. Departing
from these initial ideas, evolutionary game theory has
emerged and strategy evolution in populations was stud-
ied. In this approach it is implicit assumed the principle
of natural selection, where the payoff is equated to fit-
ness and the fittest strategy survives [2]. In this context
it was shown that the classical theory is recovered in the
replicator equation, where population is considered to be
well-mixed, that is, a population where everybody inter-
acts with everybody [2].
Cooperation cannot be supported without extra mech-
anisms [3]. Essentially two actions take place for cooper-
ation survival: maintenance of mutual cooperation and
prevention from exploitation [4]. Cooperators can be bet-
ter off only if they meet each other so that their profits
exceed defectors’ profits. If the individuals perceive that
it is important what the opponents are doing in order to
attend these two essential actions, reciprocal preferences
can come up [5–8]. Reciprocity means that what an indi-
vidual do depends on what others do to him/her directly
or indirectly. Direct reciprocity means that I choose what
to do against you depending on what you do to me. In-
direct reciprocity means that my behavior toward you
also depends on what you do to others. Another subtle
way of reciprocity is network reciprocity. Individuals are
set on the vertices of a network and interact only with
their neighbors. In this context, cooperators form clus-
ters of mutual cooperation and this mutualism is viewed
as reciprocity [9–14]. But human behavior is not so sim-
ple: individuals can adopt reciprocal strategies but, moti-
vated by internal emotion, like anger against exploitation
[15], they can punish defectors [15–17]. This would not
be so intriguing, as it is just another way of reciprocal
motives. But the important feature is that individuals
usually input costs to defectors at their own expenses.
This behavior is called altruistic punishment, because in-
dividuals pay a cost to punish even if they never met the
punished opponent again and because the punishment
acts weaken the defectors and the entire population gets
better off [15]. Reputation, rewards or repeated inter-
action, as internal motives, they all interact with pun-
ishment motives [5, 6]. Punishment involves some subtle
questions and gives rise to another evolutionary puzzle:
altruistic punishment, although seemingly usual, may be
a maladaptive trait as the punishers get worst payoffs [8].
Recently it was introduced the possibility of an “im-
plicit punishment” without turn to extra individual pref-
erences except the desire to maximize the own gain. This
was accomplished by the adoption of different strategies
against different opponents in the context of network reci-
procity with synchronous update [18]. Instead of playing
the same strategy against all of the neighbors, individu-
als can choose one different strategy against each oppo-
nent. If each player strategically updates their strategies
possibly imitating a successful random neighbor and re-
places the interaction that gives the worst payoff by the
imitated strategy, it was shown for square lattices that
cooperation was strongly supported, even for huge defec-
2tion tendency, and was robust against misjudgments of
the worst interaction. The possibility of opponent differ-
entiation introduces a mechanism of punishing without
costs and without any kind of internal preferences except
the desire of maximize own payoff. We call this punish-
ment “implicit punishment”. But in that work [18], the
possibility of adoption of different strategies was intro-
duced in the context of network reciprocity. What hap-
pens if network reciprocity is excluded? Here we analyze
this model in well mixed populations, what means that
we are excluding network reciprocity effects. The other
important feature of the model is the synchronous up-
date assumption. It is well known that results may be
striking different if asynchronous update is used [19, 20].
Here we analyze the model with both synchronous and
asynchronous updates. We show that cooperation still re-
mains alive, although for asynchronous update it achieves
its lower bound level. We analyze the model using com-
puter simulations and a mean-field technique.
2. The model
Let us state the model formally. We study the pris-
oner dilemma in a population of size N as the scenario
for the cooperation problem. We consider a well-mixed
population, what means that each player can interact
with everybody. The strategy vector of an individual is
~S = (S1, . . . , Sj, . . . , SN−1), where Sj can be C (coop-
eration) or D (defection). So individuals are merged in
N − 1 interactions. If in one of these interactions an
individual plays C against an opponent who is playing
D, we denote this interaction as (C,D) (the first entry
is the strategy of the focal player and the second en-
try is the opponent strategy). The payoff of a D strat-
egy against a C strategy is P (D,C) = b, where b > 1
is the defection tendency. Using the same notation, we
have that P (D,D) = ǫ, with ǫ << 1, P (C,C) = 1 and
P (C,D) = 0. For synchronous update, each player in-
teracts with the other N − 1 players, plays a round of
one game against each opponent, and earns a cumulative
payoff. After that, each player chooses randomly one
neighbor and compare their cumulative payoffs. If the
opponent cumulative payoff is bigger than its own one,
it imitates the strategy the opponent is using against
him/her with probability proportional to the difference
of cumulative payoffs, Π = |∆Pcum|/((N − 1)b) [21]. On
the other hand, if the opponent cumulative payoff is lower
than its own one, the focal player remains with the same
strategy. If imitation takes place, the new strategy re-
places the strategy used in the interaction that gives the
worst payoff. The worst payoff of the focal player is given
by the interaction (C,D), followed by (D,D), (C,C) and
(D,C). For asynchronous update, a random individual is
chosen so that it can imitate and possibly replace one
of its strategies like in the synchronous case. After this
individual update, the entire population play a round of
the game, and each player earns new cumulative payoffs,
and another random individual is chosen to update its
strategies. A time step consists of N of such processes.
3. Evolutionary analysis
We made our simulations using networks of size N =
40 and N = 100 and evaluate the fraction of cooper-
ation (fc) adopted by all of the players in all of their
interactions. If nc is the quantity of C strategies used
in all of the interactions by all of the players, we have
0 ≤ nc ≤ N(N − 1) and fc = nc/N(N − 1). The ran-
dom initial configuration consists of 50% of cooperation
and the averages are made over 100 different initial con-
ditions. We use ǫ = 0.001 and we show here only the
case b = 2, although we simulated the model also for
other values of b. In fact, the b value has no effect in the
simulations and in the mean-field results.
Before going on, let us state one fundamental feature
of the model that is independent if the update is syn-
chronous or not. Suppose a focal player imitates a defec-
tion strategy. We state that any interaction of type (C,C)
will never be replaced by (D,C). If some opponent adopts
defection, the focal player must have at least one (C,D)
or (D,D) interaction. But these interactions give payoffs
worst than (C,C). So (C,C) will never be replaced. This
proves the existence of a lower bound for the fraction of
cooperation given by the initial fraction of mutual coop-
eration. On the other hand, if the focal player imitates a
D strategy, he/she will first seek for (C,D) interactions.
If they are present, (C,D) will be replaced by (D,D). One
can see that mutual cooperation is never destroyed and
every exploitation is punished.
For the usual game, where each player adopts a sin-
gle strategy against all of its opponents, a single defector
can invade a population of cooperators in infinity well-
mixed population [2]. The first remarkable feature of
“implicit punishment” is that cooperation is evolutionary
stable in well-mixed population for both synchronous and
asynchronous update. If a mutant that adopts defection
against everybody appears in a population where every-
body is cooperating, the mutant initially earns a huge
payoff. But as soon as others imitate it, the exploited
(C,D) interactions will be replaced by (D,D), neutralizing
the exploitations. What is simple, but remarkable, is that
the interactions that are changing are just those in which
the exploiter is involved and all of the other mutual coop-
erations are maintained. The “implicit punishment” will
take place until the mutant cumulative payoff is equal to
cooperator cumulative payoff. If we call nexp the quan-
tity of defection adopted by the mutant exploiter, the
payoff of the mutant exploiter and the payoff of the co-
operators are Pexp = nexp(b + ǫ) and Pcoop = N − 2,
respectively. By equating both expression we have the
equilibrium fraction
nexp =
N − 2
b+ ǫ
.
Let us now discuss the results obtained by numerical
simulations with both synchronous and asynchronous up-
dates. In the initial conditions, we set the players to co-
operate with probability 0.5 against each one of its oppo-
nents. This gives an initial cooperation fraction of 50%.
3For asynchronous update, cooperation cannot dominate
population but it can coexist with defection and assumes
values near the lower-bound (25% for the initial condition
assumed here). Fig. 1 shows simulation and mean-field
approximation results for the asynchronous update. For
the synchronous update, cooperation dominates the en-
tire population. Fig. 2 shows the simulation and mean-
field approximation results for the synchronous update.
One can see in Fig. 3 that, for short times, the syn-
chronous update behaves like the asynchronous update.
At the beginning, all of the exploitations are neutralized
and only the initial mutual cooperation survives. After
that, cooperation starts to increase very slowly until it
dominates the population. So we can define a short-time
regime and a long-time regime for synchronous dynam-
ics. The same qualitative result holds for large popula-
tions, but simulation time gets extremely huge for syn-
chronous update. Fig. 4 shows a finite size analysis for
the time spent to reach the minimum value of the co-
operation fraction before cooperation dominates in the
synchronous update. Note that as along as N increases,
1/T goes to zero, implying that there is no long-time
regime for N → ∞. On the other hand, if we have N
large but finite, the long-time regime is the asymptotic
regime, which is characterized by domination of cooper-
ation.
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FIG. 1: Fraction of cooperation for asynchronous update with
N = 100 and b = 2.0.
mean-field solution provides a good equilibrium anal-
ysis in well-mixed population if the usual game is con-
sidered [22]. But in structured population, it is not a
good approximation [23]. Although in the present work
we deal with well-mixed population, the nature of the
“implicit punishment” model is not so simple. It is not
obvious that a mean-field approach would work. So it
is a remarkable result the fact that our mean-field ap-
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FIG. 2: Fraction of cooperation for synchronous update with
N = 40 and b = 2.0.
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FIG. 3: Short-time regime of the cooperation fraction for syn-
chronous update with N = 40 and b = 2.0.
proximation gives not only the stationary solutions, but
fits reasonably the in silico time evolution, although for
the synchronous update it fits well only in the short-time
regime. Let us now derive the mean-field solution. We
first analyze the asynchronous update followed by the
synchronous one.
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FIG. 4: The plot shows the relation 1/T × 1/N , where N is
the population size and T is the time to reach the minimum
value of cooperation for synchronous update.
4mean-field approximation for the asynchronous
update
Let us first define a local and a global interaction con-
centrations for a population of size N + 1. If in an in-
teraction a player i adopts strategy A and its opponent
adopts B, where A,B ∈ {C,D}, we say that player i has
a (A,B) interaction. Player i can have NAB(i) (A,B) in-
teractions. We define the local concentration of (A,B) as
the fraction of (A,B) interactions around player i, namely
xAB(i) = NAB(i)/N . For the global concentration of
(A,B) we define xAB =
∑
iNAB(i)/((N + 1)N).
We first consider a typical player, that we call focal
player. We are going to study the dynamics of the local
concentration of (C,D), (D,D), (C,C), and (D,C) interac-
tions around the focal player. Let k1, k2, k3, and k4 be
the quantity of such interactions around the focal player.
Note that k1 + k2 + k3 + k4 = N . Let us assume that
the probability of having k1, k2, k3, and k4 interactions
are given by the respective global concentrations. The
probability of a focal player configuration (k1, k2, k3) is
given by
Pk1,k2,k3 =
N !
k1!k2!k3!(N − k1 − k2 − k3)!
xk1CDx
k2
DDx
k3
CCx
N−k1−k2−k3
DC
We consider the other nodes as mean-field nodes. So the
the local concentration of (C,D), (D,D), and (C,C) inter-
actions around those nodes is given by the configuration
vector N(xCD, xDD, xCC). Now we are going to derive
the rate of variation of the local concentration around
the focal player.
Let us derive the rate of increasing of the (D,D) lo-
cal concentration. Suppose that the focal player is on
a (k1, k2, k3) configuration. Note that the payoff of this
configuration of the focal player is
PF = (N − k1 − k2 − k3)b+ k3 + k2ǫ.
There is just one transition that increases this quantity:
(C,D) to (D,D). In this replacement, the focal player
adopts C and imitates an opponent that adopts a D. So at
least one interaction of type (C,D) must be present. But
the focal player can imitate the D strategy from (C,D)
or (D,D) interactions. Let us focus on the first alterna-
tive, that happens with probability k1/N . The opponent
associated with the (C,D) interaction has a payoff of
PFCD = b+ (N − 1)(xDCb+ xCC + xDDǫ).
The probability of imitating the D strategy from (C,D)
is given by
[PFCD − PF ]Θ(PFCD − PFk)
bN
,
where Θ(x) = 1 if x > 0, and Θ(x) = 0 otherwise. The
mean rate of increasing of (D,D) by one unit due to the
imitation from (C,D) is
W+CD =
N∑
k1=1
N−k1∑
k2=0
N−k1−k2∑
k3=0
k1
N
[PFCD − PF ]Θ(PFCD − PF )
bN
Pk1,k2,k3
Following the same lines we obtain the possibility of imitating from (D,D), that is given by
W+DD =
N∑
k1=1
N−k1∑
k2=0
N−k1−k2∑
k3=0
k2
N
[PFDD − PF ]Θ(PFDD − PF )
bN
Pk1,k2,k3 .
The same analysis can be done to calculate the rate of
decreasing of (D,D). There is just one transition in-
volved, namely, (D,D) to (C,D). At least one (D,D) must
be present. The C strategy can be imitated from (C,C) or
(D,C). But note that the focal player cannot be currently
adopting a (C,D), because in that case (C,D) would give
the worst payoff. So imitating a C strategy would not
change the quantity of (D,D). Following the previous
steps, we can define
Pk2,k3 =
N !
k2!k3!(N − k2 − k3)!
xk2DDx
k3
CCx
N−k2−k3
DC ,
and we obtain that
5W−CC =
N∑
k2=1
N−k1∑
k3=0
k3
N
[PFCC − PF ]Θ(PFCC − PF )
bN
Pk2,k3(1 − δk3,0δk2,N), and
W−DC =
N∑
k2=1
N−k1∑
k3=0
N − k2 − k3
N
[PFDC − PF ]Θ(PFDC − PF )
bN
Pk2,k3(1− δk3,0δk2,N ).
As all of the nodes have the same typical behavior, be-
cause the population is well-mixed, we can approximate
the global concentrations by the local ones. The above
expressions determine the rate of (D,D) variation by one
unit. If we want the time derivative of xDD, we need do
divide the expressions by N and multiply by a factor of
two, because there is the contribution of the opponents
update . So we have
dxDD
dt
= 2
1
N
(W+CD +W
+
DD −W
−
CC −W
−
DC).
Following the same reasoning, one can see that xCC does
not change in time. Finally, as all of the mean-field vari-
ables are normalized to one, we obtain that
dxCD
dt
= −
1
2
(
dxDD
dt
+
dxCC
dt
).
We can simplify further these expressions if we replace
k1, k2 and k3 inside the payoff expressions of the focal
player by the expected value of such quantities given
by the configuration probability: NxCD, NxDD, and
NxCC , respectively. With this extra approximation the
Θ function can be easily evaluated in the limit of large
N and we have the following equation:
dxDD
dt
= 2
1
N2
{xCD + xDD
ǫ
b
[1− (1− xCD)
N−1]
−
xCC
b
[(1− xCD)
N−1 − (xCC + xDC)
N−1]}
This equation can be solved numerically. Fig.1 shows
the numerical solution and the simulation results. Note
that this approximation furnishes good results when com-
pared with in silico evolution. For the initial condition
used here, we have that the terms inside the parentheses
are 0.75 powered to N − 1 and 0.5 powered to N − 1.
If N is large, the terms that are powered to N are very
small and they can be neglected, at least for short times.
This gives the following simplified equations,
dxDD
dt
= 2
1
N2
(xCD +
ǫ
b
xDD), and
dxCC
dt
= 0.
The solution of these equation are straightforward,
xDD = x
0
DD+
ǫ
b
x0DD + x
0
CD
1
2
+ ǫ
b
[1−exp(−
2
N2
(
1
2
+
ǫ
b
)t)], and
xCC = x
0
CC ,
where the index 0 refers to the initial conditions. If we
set ǫ = 0, just for simplicity, the solution reaches the
fixed point
x∞DD = x
0
DD + 2x
0
CD, x
∞
CC = x
0
CC ,
and x∞CD = x
∞
DC = 0.
One can see that only the initial mutual cooperation can
be maintained and all of the other interactions are mutual
defections. Note that all of the exploitations are neutral-
ized. Note that this approximation gives good results if
compared to simulation data.
mean-field approximation for the synchronous
update
Let us treat the synchronous case. Now (C,C) can in-
crease, because it is possible to have a (D,D) to (C,C)
transition whenever two players make a (D,D) to (C,D)
transition in their shared (D,D) interaction. This is an
essential feature of the synchronous model. This kind
of transition does not take place in asynchronous update
and that is the reason why cooperation assumes the lower
bound value in the asynchronous case. We can approxi-
mate the rate of this transition by
dxCC
dt
=
1
NxDD
(W−CC +W
−
DC)
2.
Let us explain the term in the denominator. If the focal
player makes a (D,D) to (C,D) transition on an specific
interaction, the mean-field player associated to this spe-
cific interaction should choose exactly this interaction,
what happens with probability 1/NxDD. If we perform
the same simplifications that was already done for the
asynchronous case, we have
dxCC
dt
= 2
1
N4
{
xCC
b
[(1−xCD)
N−1−(xCC+xDC)
N−1]}2,
dxDD
dt
= 2
1
N2
{xCD + xDD
ǫ
b
[1− (1− xCD)
N−1]
−
xCC
b
[(1− xCD)
N−1 − (xCC + xDC)
N−1]}
6Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show the numerical solution of these
equations. One can see from the above equations that
xCC increases much slower than xDD. For the initial con-
dition assumed here, xCC time derivative at the begin-
ning is almost zero, because the values inside the brackets
are equal to 0.5 powered toN . But when evolution starts,
great part of (C,D) interactions are changed to (D,D) and
xCD is reduced to some value near to zero making xCC
to increase faster. So we have two regimes: short-time
regime, when xCC is kept almost constant around its ini-
tial values, and long-time regime, when xCC starts to
increase faster. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show both coopera-
tion evolution regimes. For short times, if we discard the
terms that are powered to N − 1, we have the same solu-
tion as the asynchronous case. This means that cooper-
ation assumes a value near its lower bound value, given
by the initial mutual cooperations. But for long-time
regime, xCD is near zero and x˙CC cannot be neglected.
So xCC starts to increase until it become equal to one.
So for sufficient long times, the stationary solution is
x∞CC = 1 and x
∞
CD = x
∞
DC = x
∞
DD = 0.
Note that for the short-time regime, shown in Fig. 3,
the mean-field approximation fits well when compared to
in silico evolution. For the long-time regime, the time
evolution of the mean-field solution does not fit well, al-
though it gives the right stationary solution.
From the above expressions and simulation data, we
see that the lower value of cooperation is reached very
fast in the synchronous update. But as long as popu-
lation size gets bigger, this value is reached very slowly
(see Fig. 4). Besides that, if N is large, xCC increases
very slowly. By these reasons, for large N , in the syn-
chronous update the population seems to be wrapped in
the lower value of cooperation, although what is actu-
ally happening is that cooperation is slowly increasing,
spreading until dominates the entire population.
Conclusion
Here we analyzed the model that allows the individ-
uals to choose different strategies against different op-
ponents in well-mixed populations for both synchronous
and asynchronous update. First we showed that coop-
eration is evolutionary stable for both synchronous and
asynchronous update, what means that a defector mu-
tant cannot invade a population of cooperators. We also
showed, for a initial condition of 50% of cooperation, that
for synchronous update cooperation always dominates
while for asynchronous update the cooperation fraction
assumes the lower bound given by the initial mutual co-
operation. For the synchronous update, population dy-
namics exhibits a short-time behavior that is similar to
the asynchronous update, but for suficient long times, co-
operation spreads for large N but finite. The crucial dif-
ference between synchronous and asynchronous is that in
synchronous update it is possible to have a simultaneous
update that allows a (D,D) to (C,C) transition. This does
not happen in asynchronous update. In a preview work,
the same model was analyse in a square lattice with syn-
chronous update. Here we showed that the synchronous
update is crucial for cooperation dominance while net-
work reciprocity effects are not so important. Although
the asynchronous update does not provide cooperation
dominace, it allows cooperation to survive at its lower
bound value. Note that this result in asynchronous up-
date is still better than those of the usual game.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank to CNPq and FAPEMIG, Brazilian
agencies.
[1] J. Weibull Evolutionary game theory , MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, USA (1995).
[2] M. A. Nowak, Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the
Equations of Life , 1rd ed., Harvard University Press
(2007).
[3] M. A. Nowak Science 314 1560-1563 2006.
[4] J. Henrich, N. Henrich Cognitive Systems Research 7,
220-245 (2006).
[5] D. Rand, H. Ohtsuki, M. A. Nowak J. Theor. Biol. 256,
45-57 (2009).
[6] B. Rockenbah, M. Milinski Nature 444, 718-723 (2006).
[7] H. Ohtsuki, Y. Iwasa, M. A. Nowak Nature 457, 79-82
(2009).
[8] A. Dreber, D. G. Rand, D. Fudenberg, M. A. Nowak
Nature 452 , 348-351 (2008).
[9] S. Assenza, J. Gomez-Gardenes, and V. Latora Physical
Review E 78 , 017101-1 (2008).
[10] J. Gomes-Gardenes, M. Campillo, L. M. Floria, and Y.
Moreno Physical Review Letters 98 , 108103-1 (2007).
[11] Z. Rong, X. Li, and X. Wang Physical Review E 76 ,
027101-1 (2007).
[12] J. Poncela, J. Gomez-Gardenes, L. M. Floria, and Y.
Moreno New Journal of Physics 9 , 184 (2007).
[13] M. Nakamaru, H. Matsuda, and Y. Iwasa J. Theor. Biol.
184, 65-81 1997.
[14] E. A.Sicardi, H. Fort, M. H.Vainstein, and J. J.Arenzon
J. Theor. Biol. 256, 240-246 (2009).
[15] E. Feher, S. Gachter Nature 415, 137-140 (2002).
[16] R. Boyd, H. Gintis, S. Bowles, P. J. Richerson P. Nat.
Acad. Sci. USA 100, 3531-3535 (2003).
[17] J. Henrich, R. Boyd J. Theor. Biol. 208, 79-89 (2001).
[18] L. Wardil, J. K. L. da Silva EPL 63, 38001 (2009).
[19] H. J. Blok, and B. Bergersen PNAS 90, 7716-7718 1993.
[20] H. J. Blok, and B. Bergersen Physical Review W 59,
3876-3879 1999.
[21] F.C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco Physical Rewiew Letters
795, 098104-2 (2005).
[22] G. Szab, and G. Fathb Physics Reports 446, 97-216
(2007).
[23] G. Szab, J. Vukov, and A. Szolnoki Phys. Rev. E 72,
047107 (2005).
∗To whom correspondence should be addressed (e-mail:
wardil@fisica.ufmg.br).
